The China-Europe electric vehicle tariff agreement reaches a "price commitment" framework. How will sales be in 2026?

The European Union has released the "Guidelines for Submitting Price Commitment Applications," confirming that in the context of imposing anti-subsidy taxes on Chinese electric vehicles, it allows for the replacement of high tariffs with a "Minimum Import Price (MIP) mechanism." This represents a "soft landing" phase achieved through negotiations regarding long-term friction over electric vehicle tariffs between China and Europe.

As a result, the EU has not revoked the existing anti-subsidy taxes but has provided Chinese car manufacturers with a realistic alternative path: by offering price commitments and investment commitments, they can exchange for more controllable market access conditions, which is a beneficial mechanism for the profit margins of Chinese companies and their pricing in Europe.

Part 1 From 45% High Tariffs to "Minimum Import Price": The EU's Policy Logic

According to information disclosed by the EU, pure electric vehicles exported from China to the EU are still under the effective period of the anti-subsidy tax, but companies can submit a "Price Commitment (Undertaking, UT)" to replace or reduce the existing tax burden through the Minimum Import Price (MIP) mechanism.

This differentiated tax rate reflects the EU's "investigation cooperation" mechanism and carries negotiation leverage.

The side effects of high tax rates are also evident:

◎ Raising end prices, weakening consumer welfare in Europe;

◎ Increasing inflationary pressure;

◎ Accelerating institutional confrontation in China-Europe trade friction.

After the EU concludes its anti-subsidy investigation on Chinese electric vehicles in October 2024, it has set differentiated tax rates for different car manufacturers:

◎ BYD: 17.0%

◎ Geely: 18.8%

◎ SAIC: 35.3%

◎ Tesla Shanghai Factory: 7.8%

◎ XPeng, Nio, and other cooperating companies: 20.7%

◎ Non-cooperating companies: up to 35.3%

When combined with the EU's unified 10% import tariff, the comprehensive tax burden on Chinese electric vehicles in the EU market can reach as high as 45.3%.

Against the backdrop of the United States strengthening global trade protection through "reciprocal tariff" policies, the EU has chosen to negotiate a minimum import price mechanism with China, attempting to find a balance between "industrial protection" and "legitimacy of rules."

The core of the MIP mechanism is: instead of imposing proportional taxes, it requires Chinese car manufacturers to commit to an export price not lower than a certain level to eliminate price distortions caused by subsidies, which is more "controllable" than simply increasing taxes.

According to EU documents, there are mainly two ways to determine the MIP:

◎ Based on the CIF (Cost, Insurance, and Freight) price during the investigation period + anti-subsidy tax amount, converting the tax that was originally to be paid into a "price bottom line."

◎ Benchmarking against the prices of similar non-subsidized pure electric vehicles within the EU, including sales expenses, management expenses, and "reasonable profit margins."

Due to significant differences in models and configurations, the EU requires that each model and each configuration must set an independent minimum price, greatly increasing compliance complexity and meaning that companies cannot simply respond with a "uniform quote." The European Union is concerned about three things:

◎ Whether the prices have truly eliminated the distortions caused by subsidies;

◎ Whether they are enforceable;

◎ Whether there is a risk of "cross-subsidization" avoidance, with commitments needing to be "specific, limited, and monitorable."

Investing in Europe and becoming a bargaining chip, commitments to invest in the EU manufacturing sector will be an important bonus for evaluating price commitments.

Chinese companies can make commitments regarding: annual shipment volumes, factory establishment plans in the EU, and the scale and timeline of investments.

These commitments must have clear nature, scope, timelines, funding scale, and verifiable milestones; otherwise, in the event of a breach, retroactive taxation may apply.

The EU hopes to promote local manufacturing by Chinese car companies through this, reshaping the European new energy vehicle supply chain. From an industrial policy perspective, this is a combination tool of "tariffs + industrial guidance."

Part 2 China's Strategy: Game within Rules

On the same day, the Ministry of Commerce of China issued a statement emphasizing that the results of this consultation reflect the principles of non-discrimination, the WTO rules framework, and an objective and fair evaluation mechanism.

For Chinese car companies, the realistic choice has become very clear: accept price commitments + possible European investment obligations in exchange for more stable market access.

For leading car companies with scale and financial strength, integrating into European rules is a good handling model, as Europe is a high-profit market and an important strategic stronghold for global brands.

According to the European Automobile Manufacturers Association (ACEA), in the first half of 2025, the sales share of cars manufactured in China in the EU will reach 6%, and in the second half, it will basically remain at 6-7%, higher than the 5% in the same period of 2024. EU domestic manufacturers will account for 74% of total car sales in the EU.

Germany still accounts for about 20% of EU car sales, followed by Spain, the Czech Republic, and France. According to the consulting firm AlixPartners' prediction last year, by 2030, the market share of Chinese car manufacturers in Europe may double to about 10%.

In terms of electric vehicles, Chinese car companies still held a record 12.8% share of the European electric vehicle market in November, continuing the growth momentum seen this year.

EU tariffs are still in effect, and both sides have shifted from "unilateral sanctions" to "negotiations within rules." For China, this is about seeking institutional space within the WTO framework, which is a good outcome.

Summary

The China-Europe electric vehicle game has entered a "rational phase," shifting from emotional and politicized tariff tools to more refined and institutionalized negotiation mechanisms.

The real competition is a comprehensive contest of supply chain layout capabilities, compliance capabilities, and overseas investment capabilities. For Chinese car companies, this is a good outcome.

Risk Warning and Disclaimer

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